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Contemporary psychiatry has only one generally 
accepted model, that of biological – materialist explanation 
and treatment. But clinicians recognize that this model 
omits much that is important and they therefore confront a 
dilemma: either limit their practice to an incomplete model, 
or use other models which seem unfounded and 
speculative. Philosophical considerations may help 
clinicians find a way out 1) by showing the inherent 
limitations of biological – materialist explanations, and 2) 
by grounding other (psychotherapeutic) approaches on 
general considerations of how the mind, and in particular 
language, works. These general considerations include: 
the dependence of meaning upon environmental context, 
the attribution of meaning as involving sets of skills, 
capacities and reactions, the multiplicity of language 
games and therefore their individual limitations, the 
dependence of meaning upon our shared interests, the 
largely unconscious nature of mind and our necessary 
limitations to public criteria for mental events and 
processes. 
 
1. The Hegemony of the Biological – 
Materialist Model in Contemporary 
Psychiatry 
American psychiatry is now firmly committed to a 
nearly exclusive focus on biological – materialist models of 
psychiatric conditions and their treatment. This hegemony 
of biological approaches, and the ‘descriptive’ approaches 
which are intended to lay the groundwork for biological 
explanation and treatment, has been commented upon by 
many authors – both inside and outside of psychiatry. 
Pharmacological and other biological treatments, 
such as electroconvulsive therapy, are often effective, 
particularly for more severe disorders where other types of 
treatments, such as psychotherapies, have not shown 
consistent benefit. But this exclusive focus has also 
created unease among psychiatrists and their patients. 
Psychiatry, after all, purports to be the branch of clinical 
practice which treats the whole person. The exclusive 
focus on biological – materialist interests has excluded 
many areas of patients’ lives from clinical compass.  
Despite these reservations, however, for the 
working clinician, biological approaches seem to possess 
an important advantage: a clear model which is easy to 
understand and use. This is the model of the interlocking 
biological sciences: chemistry grounding physiology, 
physiological systems organized anatomically, disorders 
localized at particular points in the causal chain located 
inside the body. It has been spectacularly successful 
throughout medicine. 
By contrast, there is no generally accepted, readily 
teachable and empirically grounded model to guide other 
therapeutic approaches in psychiatry. Thus, the clarity and 
convincingness of the biological model, and the absence of 
any accepted and validated alternative among the 
psychological therapies, have contributed to the hegemony 
of biological approaches in clinical work. This leaves 
psychiatrists with a dilemma: either adhere to the biological 
– materialist model which seems logically invincible but 
clinically incomplete, or use other clinical methods (the 
psychotherapies) which are felt to be more hypothetical, 
less scientific and even, from a biological perspective, 
superfluous or frivolous. 
In what follows, we shall attempt to use recent 
philosophical considerations to support two conclusions: 1) 
the biological – materialist model, rather than being 
necessarily valid, is in fact incomplete and inadequate, and 
2) other psychological approaches to clinical 
understanding and treatment can be founded on very 
general features of mental life, and, therefore, should not 
be considered “hypothetical.” 
 
2. Problems with the Biological – Materialist 
Model in Psychiatry 
If the biological – materialist view of mind is 
inadequate or wrong, we should expect that there might be 
many ways in which it fails to fit or represent reality. And, 
in fact, philosophers have noted several. 
First, the biological or materialist conception of 
mind cannot explain or model human action. Action seems 
to involve the causal efficacy of psychological events or 
processes: our thoughts, beliefs and wishes. But if such 
thoughts, beliefs and wishes are identified with biological 
states of the brain, then it is those material states which 
are causal, and the experienced psychological states 
merely ‘drop out’ in terms of their causal efficacy. 
Moreover, it is completely obscure how a thought, belief or 
wish, conceived of as a mental experience could interact 
with or influence any physical state, such as the movement 
of a limb or the forming of a word. This set of age old 
problems has not received any successful or generally 
received solution. (Kim, 1998) 
Second, psychological states such as thoughts, 
beliefs or wishes have the property of intention: they refer 
to things, frequently objects outside the person whose 
thoughts, etc. they are. But how can one material thing – a 
brain state –  refer to another material thing – the object 
outside? The brain state is merely, we imagine, an 
inscription; we might as well try to imagine a scratch, or a 
mark on paper, as referring. (Putnam, 1981) Perhaps the 
brain state refers because of a complex causal chain 
which has linked that state to previous encounters with the 
referred-to object. (Putnam, 1975) But this, too, is difficult 
to imagine. Suppose that science allowed us to establish 
that, after a number of exposures to an object, a 
correlation is set up between the appearance of that object 
and a pattern of brain activity. And now suppose that that 
brain pattern were stimulated, for example by an implanted 
electrode. Is it possible, whatever my ensuing 
psychological state, that when that brain activity occurred I 
meant that object? Suppose I said, “A” (the name of A): 
would I be meaning A? It seems clear that we would not 
say this: whether I meant A would depend on much else 
(for example, whether A was present, whether I responded 
to it in certain ways, whether I handled certain related 
concepts ‘appropriately’). Only if all these other things 
were true could we say that, when the appropriate brain 
activity is stimulated, that I meant A. And therefore, only if 
all these other requirements were met could we claim that 
the appropriate causal chain had established the object – 
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meaning connection. By contrast, for many objects we can 
readily imagine multiple ways they could be meant or 
referred to – and no single pattern of brain activation would 
be necessary. 
Third, not only do thoughts, etc. refer to things, 
they refer to them in particular ways: they apply predicates 
to them, or embody a stance toward them. As Austin noted 
in connection with action (Austin, 1956), a crucial aspect of 
cognitive functioning, one which is too little considered, is 
the process of appraisal or appreciation. Not only do I 
recognize that someone is grieving, but I appreciate the 
depth and even the quality of his sorrow; I share his 
experience. Could this ‘appreciation’ be a biological – 
materialist event or process? If there are problems in my 
meaning A, for example, in the thought ‘A is f,’ there are 
exactly the same problems, it would seem, in my meaning 
‘is f.’ For appreciating or appraising that A is f is at least as 
complicated and ramified a set of activities as simply 
recognizing the presence of A. 
Fourth, it seems clear that people experience 
things: there is something it is like to be a person, and to 
be the particular person one is. (Nagel, 1974) Now it may 
not at all be true that this is a unique experience – my 
being me and you being you may or may not be similar or 
comparable – but it is at least clear that some experiencing 
is involved. It at least seems to be the case that, pace 
James, consciousness does exist. But just how 
consciousness arises from or supervenes on biological 
processes remains unknown. 
These considerations are familiar to philosophers, 
and some of them were also discussed by Freud (who held 
a ‘dual-aspect theory’ of the relationship between mind and 
brain). But most contemporary psychiatrists rarely ponder 
them. What would happen if they did? 
They would not have to give up an appropriate 
interest in the biological influences upon or causes of 
mental states. But they might feel more comfortable in 
thinking “outside the box” of biological – materialist 
explanations. If such explanations are inadequate to 
explicate our ordinary notions of mental life, they may be 
inadequate for clinical work, as well. When biological 
factors are recognized as causes or influences upon 
particular psychological states or processes, rather than as 
identical to them, psychiatrists may feel more justified in 
using other explanations and perspectives, including ones 
involving meaning, action and experience. 
 But this conclusion lacks either content or 
conviction. Psychiatrists may be justified, but are they? 
And what ‘other explanations and perspectives’ are 
available to compete convincingly with the biological? 
 
3. Wittgensteinian Considerations and the 
Psychiatric Encounter 
A useful model in psychiatry must be prescriptive: 
it must help the clinician to handle complex clinical 
situations. The biological-materialist model does guide 
clinicians, but only so far. Psychological models – 
psychoanalytic, cognitive, supportive – cover areas which 
are left out of biological – materialist approaches, but are 
also incomplete, and do not have the prima facie 
plausibility that the biological-materialist model seems to 
have. 
Much of Wittgenstein’s work, of course, concerns 
our mental life. Phillips has spoken of Wittgenstein’s 
subject as being “the possibility of language.” (Phillips, 
1999) Diamond has characterized his work as involving 
“the mind” but not “empirical psychology.” (Diamond, 1991) 
Cavell has developed Wittgenstein’s views in many ways 
which, I think, emphasize his relevance to our self-
understanding, and to psychological concerns. (Cavell, 
1979)It does not seem too much of a stretch to wonder 
whether Wittgensteinian considerations might provide 
psychiatrists with an orientation toward mental life which is 
more encompassing, and more true to it. 
The question I wish to ask is: If we try to collect 
some of Wittgenstein’s observations and reminders, can 
we do so in a way, or ways, which can interest or help the 
psychiatric practitioner?  
What might a clinician learn from Wittgenstein, and 
from other contemporary philosophers who have followed 
his lead? Here are several key ideas which, I believe, are 
commonly identified as being ‘Wittgensteinian’. 
(Wittgenstein, 1958) 
1. The meaning of what we say depends upon the 
context, or environment, in which words are uttered. Any 
word or group of words takes its meaning from how it is 
used: in what context, to achieve what purposes. This 
means the interpersonal context as well as the non-
personal. 
2. When we ascribe a thought to someone, 
including oneself, we are attributing to that person not the 
presence of an inner picture or silent sentence, or even an 
unconscious model. Rather, we are attributing to him or 
her a set of skills, capacities and reactions. Thus, 
someone’s knowing the meaning of a word means that she 
can use it appropriately and can use related concepts 
appropriately: that, in other words, so far as that word or 
set of words is concerned, she responds more or less as 
we all do. 
3. There is not one type of language game, but 
there are many. While many words are names, many 
others are not. While the purpose of some propositions is 
description, the purpose of others is not. A poem is not a 
theorem of logic or a newspaper account. 
From this it follows that words and concepts have 
limited uses. This observation is of  singular importance to 
psychology. Wittgenstein emphasized that psychological 
concepts are heterogeneous. By this, I think he meant, for 
example, that while the report of an event, the report of a 
dream and the report of a pain may all appear similar, the 
grammars of these various ‘reports’ are different in ways 
that may have clinical importance. (For example, if there is 
some detail missing from your report of yesterday’s event, 
I might look for another witness; but that would not be 
possible for your dream or pain.) 
4. What we mean follows our interests and what 
we care about: what we care about is shown in what we 
do. Wittgenstein emphasized that words take on meaning 
as parts of our practices and ways of living. The words we 
use thus reflect our natural and learned reactions; in fact, 
communication requires that we share such reactions. It 
seems a natural extension that what we care about 
includes other people’s interests. 
5. Mind is largely unconscious. This may seem 
inappropriate in a list of Wittgensteinian themes, since it is 
a point made by Freud, not Wittgenstein. But if meaning 
and communication depend upon our shared reactions, 
and such reactions are shown only through or in our overt 
behavior, including speaking, then these all-important 
reactions and dispositions are unconscious: they are 
shown only by their effects; they are hypothetical entities, 
but necessary ones. 
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6. An ‘inner process’ stands in need of outer 
criteria. I think it is not clear how Wittgenstein intended us 
to take this famous dictum: I imagine that he rather 
grudgingly accepts that this way of talking has its uses. 
The importance of this for psychiatry is that at least one 
kind of uncertainty in attributing psychological predicates to 
people (the kind that can be formulated in the question: 
“How can you know whether A is really imagining, 
remembering, projecting, incorporating, etc., since you 
would have to see inside him?”) is itself made unstable 
and of uncertain, questionable sense. If you look for 
evidence of criteria being satisfied there, you will not find 
them. It still leaves wide open, of course, how such words 
in fact are used, how difficult it can still be to know such 
things, or why you are “tempted” to feel shut out as you do. 
How might these Wittgensteinian considerations 
be of use to a psychiatrist? When psychiatrist and patient 
meet, the psychiatrist begins to react: she hears what the 
patient says and how he presents himself according to her 
(the psychiatrist’s) orientation. If that orientation is 
biological – materialist, the psychiatrist will be led in certain 
directions: to elicit symptoms, make a diagnosis, consider 
medication. But a clinician wanting to use other, perhaps 
psychotherapeutic, orientations lacks an equally clear and 
accepted model. It is this gap which, I believe, 
Wittgensteinian considerations may help to feel. 
Wittgenstein’s investigations into the nature of the mind 
can orient the psychiatric clinician in several important 
ways. 
First, it can attune him or her to the fact that every 
communication, every expression, receives its content or 
meaning, from the context in which it is uttered. Every 
statement is a ‘move’ in a language game. This means that 
every communication, every statement involves the 
relationship of at least two people – and ‘involving the 
relationship’, itself, depends upon certain usually implicit 
appraisals and motivations. Behind or under every ‘chief 
complaint’ and expression of distress, this feature of 
meaning is present. It is, therefore, always a potential 
focus of clinical interest. 
Second, it is acceptable, in fact necessary, to keep 
in mind a mixture, not a synthesis or unified structure, of 
multiple language games. These may involve making a 
biological-materialist diagnosis, but they may also involve 
thinking about what the patient is doing, where she is 
coming from (psychologically, what her history has been) 
or what she is intending. These multiple approaches do not 
necessarily form a unity, although we may learn, 
empirically, that they share certain connections and 
associations. 
Third, what we say and mean depends upon our 
interests and what Cavell has called our “routes of feeling 
(Cavell).” Clinically, this means that when the psychiatrist 
listens, what he can hear, through or in the patient’s words, 
are his or her latent, underlying interests or intentions. This 
is not a hypothesis, for example, of the existence of 
transferential elements in our current day interpersonal 
relationships. Rather, it is a feature of communication 
itself. 
Fourth, the clinician is provided with certain 
methods or ways of focusing, which permit him or her to 
get to know the patient better. Understanding fully what the 
patient means requires knowing his or her history. For 
example, if we want to know why someone did some 
particular action, we must look at his or her reasons, and 
that means knowing about his or her past (Anscombe, 
1957) Historical understanding is thus necessary to a full 
understanding of human behavior.  
Because what we say gains its meaning only 
within a network of activities (forms of life) which are 
extended in space and time and not directly present, the 
clinician is attuned to the fact that what the patient means 
may not be obvious – to the patient or to the clinician. 
Even apparently simple reports of direct experiences need 
to be explored for their uses, their roles in patterns of 
activity. For example, when the patient says he feels 
anxious, this may appear to be a simple report of a feeling. 
But in fact, identifying it as anxiety already presupposes 
the mastery of this concept. Exploration of how this 
concept ‘works’ may provide important insight into the 
patient’s meaning, and, therefore, world. Nussbaum, for 
example, has suggested, following the Stoics, that 
emotions are appraisals of our relationships to essential 
aspects of the world which are outside of our control. 
(Nussbaum, 2001) 
Fifth, the clinician is provided with what we might 
call a ‘meta approach’ to understanding how patients 
change, and, therefore, how we may help them to change. 
To influence what the patient thinks and means must be to 
influence what he or she intends: his interests and routes 
of feeling. As Havens has pointed out, our language is rich 
in resources for doing this. Simple empathic statements 
(“How awful!”) or what Havens calls “extensions” (“You 
must have missed him very much”) are not intended to 
convey information, but to elicit, amplify and thus change 
certain reactions. (Havens, 1986) 
The same may also be said for reconstructions of 
the past. Much debate in and about psychiatry has focused 
on whether the past can be truly known, for example, 
whether the events patients report actually occurred. But in 
many clinical situations there is little real doubt about the 
truthfulness of patients’ reports of the past. The clinical 
question is, rather: what does it mean to be aware of the 
influence of the past? What role can an awareness of the 
past play in one’s life? This question echoes one 
suggested by Anscombe: how do we so much as develop 
a concept of the past, and what does it mean to have one? 
(Anscombe, 1950). Her answer was that it means being 
able to appreciate and participate in certain activities, for 
example, referring to events in particular ways. More fully 
appreciating our own past changes our ways of seeing it, 
and that is another example of our changing our 
dispositions, reactions and “routes of feeling.” 
Sixth, this approach allows the clinician to keep 
what is valuable in empirically validated treatments, for 
example cognitive – behavioral approaches to various 
symptoms, while continuing to see them as useful 
techniques within a larger context – the context of human 
life, with its structures of meaning and forms of activity. 
Seventh, the clinician is provided with a map of the 
normal, and ways of identifying and localizing the 
abnormal (Havens). What is normal is encoded into our 
ordinary uses of words: these ways of living, with these 
words have been found, for the most part, to ‘work.’ Others 
might work better, equally or less well. The clinician listens 
to the patient’s uses of words and compares them with his 
own – his own as benchmarks for the normal. But the 
clinician is also always aware that a) he, too may be 
misusing language, b) disagreements are not usually 
resolved by proof or disproof, and c) many forms of life are 
possible. 
In summary, philosophical explorations might help 
clarify what it means to say that the psychiatric encounter 
is a meeting of two people – one seeking and one offering 
help. Recognizing the nature of our language games helps 
define the broader human compass by which any, 
particular clinical technique is supported and sustained. 
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